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On the Economics of Rational Self-Medication 
 
Summary 
It has been established in the medical literature that self-medicating with imperfect 
information about either the use of a genuine or counterfeit drug or based on wrong self-
diagnosis of ailment, which is predominant especially in developing countries, is a risky 
investment in health capital. This paper models the decision to self-medicate and the 
demand for self-medicated drugs. We suppose that investment in self-medication 
depends on the perception of its effectiveness. The results obtained show that the 
decision to self-medicate depends on the relative price and perceived effectiveness of 
self-medication, the elasticity of the shadow value of health with respect to the quantity 
of health capital, and the relative effectiveness of self-medication in reducing the 
unpredictable changes in health capital. Furthermore, if an individual self-medicates, 
self-medication becomes a normal good: it increases if income increases; and it obeys 
the law of demand (i.e. it increases if its price, relative to that of the risk-free 
medication, decreases). Moreover, we have shown that some optimum subsidy can 
discourage self-medication.  
 
Keywords: Health Production, Self-Medication, Risky Investment, Government Policy, 
Dynamic Analysis 
 











Address for correspondence: 
 
Wisdom Akpalu 
Center for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA) 
Agricultural Annex 
University of Pretoria  
0002 Pretoria 
South Africa 





1.  Introduction 
 
 
While responsible self-medication, which is limited to over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, 
may generate substantial net benefit flows to economies through savings in travel and 
consultation time and the direct financial cost of treatment (AESGP, 2004), some 
conditions are necessary for these benefits to be realized. These conditions aim at 
ensuring the safety of taking self-medicated drugs. They include the following: the drugs 
used are those indicated for conditions that are self-recognizable; the user should know 
how to take or use the drugs; the effects and possible side-effects of the drugs as well as 
ways of monitoring these side-effects are well communicated to the user; possible 
interactions with other drugs is known by the user; duration of the course of the drugs is 
known by the user and, when the user must seek professional intervention (WHO, 1998). 
The consequences for incorrect diagnosis and dosage include growing resistance to some 
drugs and further deterioration in health capital.   
Unfortunately, especially in developing countries, professional health care is 
relatively  expensive and in some cases not readily available thereby making self-
medication an obvious choice of health care service (Chang and Trivedi, 2003; Phalke et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, it has been noted that purchases of prescription-only drugs are 
far more than the purchase of OTC drugs (Chang and Trivedi, 2003; WHO, 2001) and 
many drugs that can only be purchased with prescription in developed countries are OTC 
in developing countries (Chang and Trivedi, 2003). Also, lax medical regulations have 
resulted in the proliferation of counterfeit drugs that are in high demand for the treatment 
of highly prevalent diseases such as malaria (see e.g. Shakoor et al., 1997; WHO, 1999; 
Rogendaal, 2001; Basco, 2004). For example, a study by Basco (2004) in Africa on the 
use of chloroquine, quinine and antifolates showed that about 30%, 74% and 12% of 
these malaria drugs respectively had either no active ingredient, insufficient active 
ingredient, the wrong ingredient or an unknown ingredient. Moreover, a considerable 
number of studies have also highlighted the potential dangers of self-medication (Levy,  4
1992; Mudur, 1999; WHO, 2001). As a result, taking a self-medicated drug is a risky 
investment in health capital
1.  
Although self-medication is very common and expected to grow as a result of the 
use of the internet to market drugs and deregulation of OTC sale of drugs with active 
ingredients (see e.g. Chang and Trivedi, 2003; Phalke et al., 2006), economic models for 
such a risky investment in health capital are very scarce. The only attempt at modeling 
the economics of self-medication is by Chang and Trivedi (2003) who developed a static 
model based on choice under uncertainty. In their model, the individual allocates her 
budget between the consumption of a composite good, a self-medicated drug and 
professional care. While professional care is assumed to be risk-free, self-medication is 
not. The main results from their theoretical model are as follows: First, self-medication 
obeys the law of demand. Second, self-medication is an inferior good. Third, riskier self-
medication will increase the demand for professional care. While the first and the third 
results were confirmed by their data, they found that self-medication was a normal good 
for the low-income group (i.e. 50
th percentile) and an inferior good for the high-income 
group. Like Chang and Trivedi (2003), this paper assumes that the individual maximizes 
utility from consuming a composite good and a state of health. However, we extend this 
work in a number of ways. First, since health capital is a state variable that evolves 
overtime in a partly uncertain manner due to unexpected ailments, we present the state of 
health equation as a stochastic dynamic equation (see e.g. Grossman, 1972; Cropper, 
1977; Reid, 1996; Picone et al., 1997; Sidorenko, 2001 for stochastic models of health); 
second, total expenditure on medication within a period of time is the expected 
expenditure on self-medication and risk-free medication, where the probability weights 
are based on the individual’s perception of the effectiveness of the self-medicated drug 
and the risk-free medication
2; third, the expected health benefit from self-medication 
depends on perceived effectiveness of self-medication. Moreover, in this paper, the 
marginal conditions in the presence of self-medication and risk-free medication only have 
been compared to determine the optimal subsidy necessary to discourage self-medication.  
                                                 
1 Self-medication is considered risk-free if and only if it is limited to an OTC drug that is not counterfeited.  
2 Note that commitment to self-medication only is not feasible, since the individual has to resort to 
prescribed medication if self-medication fails.  5
The results obtained from the optimization program indicates that the decision to 
self-medicate depends on the relative price of the two medications (i.e. an individual may 
switch to self-medication if it becomes relatively cheap), the perceived effectiveness of 
self-medication, the elasticity of the shadow value of health with respect to the quantity 
of health capital and the relative effectiveness of self-medication in reducing the 
uncertain component of the dynamics of the health capital. Furthermore, our results 
illustrate that self-medication is a normal good for those who engage in it: thus, it 
increases if income increases; and it obeys the law of demand (i.e. it increases if its 
relative price decreases). Finally, the optimal subsidy that can discourage self-medication 
must be decreasing in both the relative price and the perceived effectiveness of the self-
medicated drug but increasing in the elasticity of the shadow value of the health with 
respect to the quantity of health capital, if the self-medicated drug is more effective in 
reducing the unexpected shocks to health capital. On the other hand, if the two 
medications are equally effective in reducing the stochastic component of the dynamics 
of the health capital, the subsidy is just the price difference between the two medications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in section 2 
followed by the economic policy instrument in section 3. The last section presents the 
conclusions and the discussions of the paper.  
 
 
2.  The model 
 
A stochastic model of self-medication: finding the optimal usage 
 
 
Suppose a representative individual derives utility  (,) uch from her state of health h and 
the consumption of a composite good c. Furthermore, assume that the utility is 
increasing in the two arguments (i.e.  0 h u > , 0 c u > , where the subscripts denote partial 
derivatives), the individual’s life expectancy is T years, and future states of health is 
discounted at the rate δ ,  0 δ > . The objective function of the individual is to maximize 
the expected value of the discounted stream of utility (i.e. equation 1), where E is an 






c Max V E u c h e dt
δ − = ∫ ,                                            (1) 
 
 
where  0, 0 ch ≥≥ . Let the health capital or the state of health evolve according to a 
stochastic dynamic process defined by the function: 
 
 
() ( ) (,) (,) d h syg h d t syg h d z ασ =− − ,                               (2) 
 
where  0 0, 0, 0,  and  (0) . ygm hh ≥≥> =  
 
From this equation,  (,) ss yg =  is the health benefit from self-medicated and risk-
free (e.g. prescribed) drugs (i.e. y and  g , respectively) used by the individual and the 
constant α  is the net natural depreciation of the health capital. The term  (.) σ  defines the 
volatility or the variance of the health state dynamics,  z is a Weiner process and dz is the 
change in the stochastic process. Note that we assume that the variance is linearly related 
to  s, with a drift term. Thus, the equation has a deterministic component, which is the 
first term in the right hand side, and a stochastic or uncertain component, which is the last 
term of the right hand side. Beginning with the seminal paper of Grossman (1972), a 
number of studies have modeled health state as a dynamic process (see e.g. Picone et al., 
1998). Also, Arrow (1963) introduced uncertainty in the incidence of illness in health 
care delivery. A number of studies have combined uncertainty and dynamics in modeling 
health capital (see e.g. Picone et al., 1998; Sidorenko, 2001).  
The individual has to complement self-medication with professional medical care 
if the self-medication fails. As a result, the agent cannot solely depend on self-
medication. Let m  be real disposable income within a period of time t;  p  and q are 
perfect competitive relative prices of the composite good c and self-medicated drug  y  
respectively, with risk-free medication g  being the numeraire. Furthermore, let v be a 
subjective probability defining how effective the self-medicated drug is perceived to be. 
If it is perceived to be as effective as the prescribed drug, then  1 v =   and the agent is  7
indifferent between using a self-medicated or prescribed drug. Consequently, the agent 
will invest in only a self-medicated drug if it is less expensive (i.e. mq yp c = +  if all the 
budget is spent). On the other hand, if the self-medicated drug is perceived to be 
completely ineffective then  0 v = , which implies that only the prescribed drug will be 
purchased. However if self-medication is present but the drug is perceived not to be 
completely effective, then  (0,1) v∈ . Therefore the term  (1 ) qvy v g + −  defines expected 
expenditure on medication if self-medication is present. Note that the expenditure on the 
self-medicated drug increases as v increases. The budget constraint facing the agent 
within a period of time, say one year, is:   
 
(1 ) mp c q v y v g = ++ −.                                        (3) 
 
We have supposed for simplicity, but without compromising generality, that there 
is no inter-temporal transfer of income between periods
3. Moreover, the equation 
assumes that the entire budget is expended within each period. Note that although the 
expenditure on either the self-medicated drug or prescribed drug is stochastic, the 
probability is just a weight, which defines how the budget on the drugs is allocated. 
Consequently, the expected and actual expenditure should be equal in each period.  Thus, 
like Chang and Trivedi (2003) a partial equilibrium approach is taken to model demand 
for health where the representative agent allocates her entire disposable income to health 
care and other composite commodities within each period. Moreover, it is supposed that 
the state of health does not affect the disposable income. It is noteworthy that this mimics 
the situation in many economies (especially developing countries) where fixed-income 
earners e.g. salary workers who receive fixed disposable income hardly save or have easy 
access to credit from formal financial institutions to finance consumption. It is also noted 
that the poor in developing countries hardly save or have easy access to credit (Aryeetey, 
1994). 
The Bellman equation associated with equations (1) through (3) writes 
                                                 
3 The budget constraint has been specified as wealth (w) dynamic equation by some studies, e.g. Picone 
(1998). In our case it could be specified as  ( ) (1 ) dw rw pc vqy v g dt =− −− − .  If it is assumed for 
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Using Ito’s lemma, we have the following definition  
 
 












,                                       (5) 
 
By substituting dhfrom equation (2) into equation (5), we have 
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If equation (5´) is expanded, noting that for Weiner processes the following apply:   
0 dtdt = , dzdz dt = ,  ()0 Ed z=  and  0 dtdz = , we have   
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Following Xepapadeas (1997), the corresponding current value Hamiltonian 







 is the shadow value of 
the state of health. Moreover, since the disposable income is fixed, equation (9) 
represents the Lagrangean function for the optimization program, which is the sum of the 






h H uch s h E s h λ ασ λ =+ − + % .           (8) 
 
( ) (1 ) L Hm p c v q yv g ω =+ −− − − .                   (9) 
 
 
The first order condition of equation (9) with respect to the choice variables: c, 
y and  g ; and the Lagrangean multiplier ω  are equations (10) through (13) respectively. 
The corresponding costate equation is equation (14). 
 
c up ω = .                        (10) 
 
2
yh s y vq h s h E s ω λλ σ =+ .                       (11) 
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or 
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The interpretation of equation (10) is straightforward: in equilibrium, the marginal 









) should be equal to 
the utility of the price of the good (i.e.  p ω ). Rewriting equations (11) and (12), and using 
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=  is the elasticity of the shadow value of health with respect to the quantity 
of health capital (i.e. how sensitive the value an individual places on her health capital is 
to a change in her state of health). Consequently, the weighted sum of the marginal health 











hp E λη σ
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%% .                    (15) 
 
From equation (15), the expected health benefit from a marginal increase in the use of the 
self-medicated and prescribed drugs (i.e.  y g ss + %% ) must reflect some adjusted marginal 
opportunity cost of the composite good per unit of the health capital (i.e. the term at the 
right hand side of the equation). Note that v and  s Eσ  appear in equation (15) due to the 
individual’s perceived uncertainty about how effective the self-medicated drug is and the 
uncertainty about the health dynamics of her health capital respectively.   
 
 
Risk-free medication  
 
 
If the individual does risk-free medication, the optimization program becomes 
maximizing equation (1) subject to the following constraints 
 
() ( ) () () dh w g hdt w g hdz ασ =−− ,                          (16) 
 
 mp cg = + ,                                         (17) 
 
  11
where  () ww g =  is the health benefit from risk-free medication only. The corresponding 
Bellman’s equation is equation (18), and the Hamiltonian and the Lagrangean functions 
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h H uch w h w h λ ασ λ =+ − + .                          (19) 
 
( ) L Hm p c g ω = +− − .                            (20) 
 
 
The first order derivative of equation (20) with respect to c and  g gives equations 
(21) and (22), respectively. 
      c up ω = .                                                     (21) 
 
2
g wg h hw w h ω λσλ =+  .                                      (22) 
 
The corresponding costate equation is the same as equation (14). Again, using equation 
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The optimal condition for self-medication 
 
 
In this section the optimal condition for self-medication is derived.  
  12









 and the 
condition for self-medication for all  (0,1) v∈  is  s w Eσ σ ≥ . On the other hand, self-
medication will not occur if  s w Eσ σ < .  
 
 
Proof. The proof requires comparing the weighted sum of the marginal health benefit if 
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 is some adjusted relative effectiveness of self-medication in 
reducing the uncertain component of the change in health capital. Moreover, since 
(0,1) q∈ , the condition that self-medication will occur for all  (0,1) v∈  is  1 A≥  (i.e. 
s w Eσ σ ≥ ). Thus, if the price of the self-medicated drug is lower than that of the risk-free 
drug, self-medication will be present if the self-medication, on the average, is more 
effective (relative to the risk-free medication) in reducing the uncertain component of the 
dynamics of the health capital.  On the other hand, if qA >  self-medication will not 
occur since the perceived probability cannot be greater than 1 (i.e.  (0,1) v∉ . But qA >  
implies that  () 11 ws qE ηση σ +> +. Since  (0,1) q∈ , it follows that 11 ws E ηση σ +> +  
and  s w Eσ σ < .■  13
 
 
Lemma 1:  The likelihood of self-medicating will increase if the price of the self-
medicated drug decreases or if the perception of the effectiveness of self-medication 
improves, ceteris paribus.  
 









 should hold for an individual to self-medicate, it follows that 









. However, a sufficient reduction in q could 
change the sign and make self-medication worthwhile. Thus, any policy that increases the 
cost of accessing professional health care may encourage individuals to switch to self-
medication. Furthermore, all other things being equal, an increase in v for example 
through a public campaign on the effectiveness of a self-medicated drug will encourage 
individuals who do risk-free medication to take the drug.■ 
 
 
The extent of self-medication 
 
 
Given that the representative agent self-medicates, this section discusses the extent to 
which self-medication is done. To facilitate the discussion, some specific forms of the 
functions in the preceding sections are assumed. Suppose there is diminishing marginal 
health benefit from increased usage of a prescribed or a self-medicated drug so that   
() ww g kg
β == , where  0 k >  and  ( ) 0,1 β ∈ . Furthermore, let the health benefit that an 
individual obtains if she self-medicates be the weighted sum of the benefit from taking 
the self-medicated and prescribed drugs, with the weights being v. Thus, 
() (,) ( 1 )
t s yg kv y v g
βε β + =+ −  and  ( )
2 0.5 () ( 1 ) E ss k v y v g
ε βμ σ β ++ == +− % , where ε  is a 
random variable which takes positive or negative values and has the following moments:  14
() E ε μ =  and 
2 var( ) ε ε σ =
4. Furthermore, assume the subjective probability of the 
effectiveness of the self-medicated drug is based on experience so that the relationship 
between  t ε  and ν  is defined by a cumulative probability density function. Let this 
function be  ( )




≤+ = − = , which implies that  ( )
2 0.5
1 ve
ε μ σ −+
−=  
and  ()
2 0.5 ln(1 ) v ε μσ += − − . Figure 1 depicts the probability density function of the 
effectiveness of self-medication. Note that  () t f ε  is the probability density function and 
the shaded area of the graph defines the perceived subjective probability of non-
effectiveness of the self-medicated drug.  
 
Figure 1: Probability density function of the effectiveness of self-medication 
 
 
Using this definition, dividing equation (11) by (12) and solving for g gives 
     
g y
σ υ = ,                             (25) 
where 
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= . The budget constraint can therefore be re-specified as 
                                                 
4 Note that if e  is non-stochastic, then 
2 0.5 () Ee e
ε β μσ βε ++ + =  if  () E ε μ =  and 
2 var( ) ε ε σ = . 
2 0.5 ε μ σ +
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.                             (27) 
 
Figure 2 depicts the graph of equations (25) and (26). As can be inferred from the 
equations and seen from the figure, the model gives a unique equilibrium solution. 
However, since it is impossible to obtain close-form solutions for 
* y  and 
* g  from 
equation (27) using existing mathematical software, the following section is devoted to 
some mathematical simulations.  
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g y
σ υ =
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 g mv v q v y θω =− − − − 
Quantity of self-medicated drug 
Quantity of risk-free  
medicated drug  16
Numerical simulation of the extent of self-medication 
 
 
In this section, some parameter values are used to simulate the equilibrium relationship 
between equations (25) and (26).  The values are chosen to satisfy the a priori restriction 
on the parameters. Thus, ,, ( 0 , 1 ) vq β ∈ ;  0 m >  and  0 θω > . The results presented in Table 
1 are based on a simple numerical simulation of equation (27). First, the results show that 
self-medicated drug obeys the law of demand. From the table, a decrease in the relative 
price of the self-medicated drug results in an increase in the demand for the self-

















). This result can be seen by comparing the figures in the baseline column to 
that of the fourth column (i.e. for q ↓). Moreover, the self-medicated drug is a normal 
good. Thus, a reduction in the disposable income (i.e. m ↓) decreases the demand for 

















Second, the results indicate that there is an inverse relationship between the 
quantities of the self-medicated drug and risk-free medication that is taken on one hand, 
and the effectiveness of self-medication on the other. From the last column of Table 1, an 
increase of v from 0.5 to 0.7, all other things being equal, decreased the use of both the 
















). However, in relative 
terms, the use of self-medicated drug is intensified several fold (i.e. 
** yg increases 







Table 1. Simulated values of real expenditure on self-medicated and risk-free drugs. 
Parameters/Variables Baseline  m ↓ q ↓ v ↑ 
m   10.0   8.0  10.0 10.0 
θω    0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4 
q   0.8   0.8   0.6   0.8 
v   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.7 
β    0.3   0.3   0.3   0.3 
* y   24.2 19.2 32.2 17.1 
* g   0.135642 0.135335 0.090183 0.009393 




3.  Economic incentive to discourage self-medication 
As noted earlier, due to lack of adequate knowledge on some drugs, the proliferation of 
counterfeit drugs and the sale of prescription-only drugs as OTC drugs, self-medication 
remains a risky investment in health capital. Moreover, any reduction in health capital 
may impact negatively on the productive capacities of economies. As a result, policy 
interventions may be required to discourage self-medication. In this section, an attempt is 
made at obtaining such a policy instrument. Suppose an individual prefers self-
medication to risk-free medication (i.e. s w Eσ σ > ), a subsidy rate of τ  that makes 
equation (24) hold with equality could be defined. Thus, an expression where the 





























Proposition 2. The subsidy must be decreasing in the relative price of the drugs and the 
perceived probability of effectiveness of self-medication, but increasing in the elasticity of 
the shadow value of health with respect to the quantity of health capital if  1 A> . 
 
 
Proof. The proof for proposition 2 requires taking partial derivatives of equation (29) 
with respect to the parameters q,v and  η ; and looking at the sign of the derivatives. The 




































.                                  (32) 
 
Thus, if it becomes more expensive to self-medicate, a lower subsidy rate is necessary to 
discourage self-medication. Furthermore, if it is less risky to self-medicate, the subsidy 
must decrease. Moreover, the subsidy must increase if the elasticity of the shadow value 
of health with respect to the quantity of health capital increases. This is because, if self-
medication is more effective in reducing the unpredictable changes in the state of health, 
then the more an individual values her state of health, the more she self-medicates. A 
higher subsidy is therefore necessary to discourage such an individual from self-
medicating.       
 
 
Proposition 3. The subsidy must be decreasing in the relative price of self-medicated and 
risk-free or prescribed drugs but neither sensitive to a change in perceived probability of 
effectiveness of the self-medicated drug nor the elasticity of the shadow value of health 
with respect to the quantity of the health capital if  1 A= .  19
 
Proof. If   1 A = , then equation (29) becomes  1 q τ = − . Consequently, 
 


















.                   (33) 
 
Thus, if the individual perceives the self-medicated drug on the average, as effective as 
the risk-free or prescribed drug in reducing the uncertain component of the health capital, 
then self-medication can only be discouraged if the price differentials between the self-
medicated and risk-free or prescribed drugs are eliminated.   
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
 
In developing countries, professional health care is relatively expensive and in some 
cases completely absent. This situation has created high demand for self-medicated drugs 
for the treatment of highly prevalent diseases such as malaria. Incorrect diagnosis and 
dosage, the availability of prescription-only drugs as OTC medication and lax 
pharmaceutical policies that are leading to proliferation of counterfeit drugs contribute to 
making self-medication a risky investment in health capital. Although self-medication is 
common, economic models for such a risky investment are very scarce, with the only 
exception being the static model of Chang and Trivedi (2003). This paper extends the 
static model to a stochastic dynamic one, for two situations: where self-medication is 
present and where it is not present.   
The results obtained show that an individual may resort to self-medication if the 
price of self-medicated drugs decreases relative to that of risk-free medication. Secondly, 
self-medication could occur if the individual perceives that its effectiveness has 
increased.  Third, self-medication could occur if the elasticity of the shadow value of 
health with respect to the quantity of health capital increases and if self-medication is 
relatively more effective in reducing the uncertain component of the dynamics of health 
capital. Furthermore, self-medication increases if income increases, which makes it a  20
normal good; and it obeys the law of demand. Finally, it has been shown that some 
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